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event, the contract was unfair to the corporation, because there was inade-
quate consideration flowing to it, inasmuch as Buck's agreement with the
defendant provided for payment to him of a pension for past services only.
If the rule is as stated above, an inquiry into the fairness of the contract
would seem to be superfluous," and in any situation where the court found
an interested board, the corporation could avoid the contract. An investiga-
tion into the fairness of the contract would be necessary only where a
disinterested board was found and the corporation was trying to avoid the
contract. Thus, it would appear that the minority took an extra and un-
necessary step in determining the question of fairness.
The controlling opinion, on the other hand, seems, in part at least, to
support the Veeser rule." Since, in the opinion of the majority, the three
directors whose interests were in question were motivated by the best in-
terests of the corporation and not by self-interest, the action by the directors
was adjudged not invalid; rather it comes within the meaning of Veeser, in
that the resolution had the support of a majority of the disinterested
directors. This approach appears to employ a "business judgment" test, in
that if the board is disinterested and the directors show that they thought
the contract was advantageous to the corporation, the court will not inquire
into the fairness of the agreement. 14 Yet the court did inquire into the fair-
ness, as mentioned earlier. This step would appear to be unnecessary, where
a disinterested board is found and a "business judgment" test is used.
If the four situations mentioned above arose in a Michigan court, it is
unquestionable that both the majority and minority views would reject the
contract in situation (1), where the board is interested and the contract
unfair, and support the contract in situation (4), where the board is disin-
terested and the contract fair. Under the minority view, it is unclear whether
a situation (2) contract, i.e., fair contract entered into by an interested
board would be upheld or rejected. A situation (3) contract, i.e., an unfair
contract entered into by a disinterested board, probably would be voidable.
Similarly, the majority would probably support the contract in situation (2),
but in a situation (3) it is uncertain whether they would accept or reject.
DAVID C. DONOHUE
Labor Law—Applicability of LMRA to the "Foreign-Fkg-Fleet."—
Empresa Hondurena de Vapores v. McLeod.'—Plaintiff, a Honduran
steamship corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the United Fruit
Company (UFCO), a New Jersey corporation. The bulk of UFCO's trade
is between Central and South American sites and United States ports. It
deals almost entirely through foreign subsidiaries such as plaintiff. UFCO
12 Supra note 2.
13 Supra note 1, at 762.
14 Supra note 8.
1
 — F.2d —, 49 L.R.R.M. 2443 (2d Cir. 1962).
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organized plaintiff in 1941, supplied the capital for the venture and, as sole
stockholder, elects plaintiff's directors. There are no interlocking directors,
and plaintiff, in its day-to-day operations seems to function as a distinct
corporate entity. The seamen employed by plaintiff are Honduran citizens
and members of a Honduran labor union. Its business has been almost
exclusively limited to chartering vessels to UFCO. A treaty between the
United States and Honduras2 provides that the flag of the ship shall de-
termine its nationality3 and that while the ship is in port, a consular officer
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over internal controversies. 4 On a petition
by the National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, seeking to repre-
sent the unlicensed seamen aboard plaintiff's vessel, the NLRB determined6
that plaintiff's operation was not that of a foreign nation which the neces-
sities of trade had brought into contact with the United States, but was,
rather, a part of an American corporation's trade in foreign commerce and,
therefore, subject to the provisions of the LMRA. 6 On a motion to the
federal district court to enjoin the NLRB from conducting a representation
election, the Board claimed that there was no jurisdiction in the district
court.? The court took jurisdiction on the assertion of the deprivation of
several constitutional rights, but deemed the petition premature as no
irreparable injury would arise until the American union either won or tried
to enforce the election results on plaintiff. 8 On appeal the District Court
was reversed. HELD: 1) The jurisdiction of the district court could not be
based on the deprivation of constitutional rights nor on a violation of a
specific mandate of the LMRA. But where a friendly foreign power would
be adversely affected, the Board's action, even where not plainly wrong, is
reviewable by a federal district court; 2) The prevailing interests of Hon-
duras outweigh any contact with the United States so that the LMRA does
not apply. Since the action by the Board would infringe on the jurisdiction
of a foreign nation contrary to the intent of Congress, the court would act
to prevent the election and minimize any offense to the foreign government.
The principal case presents the question to what extent, if any, does
the LMRA apply to foreign flag ships within the territorial waters of the
United States. Literally read the LMRA could have been intended to apply
to all ships that come within the United States waters to carry on corn-
2
 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Honduras, Dec. 2,
1927, 45 Stat. 2618.
3 Id., Art. 10.
4 Id., Art, 22.
5 United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 25, 49 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1961).
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958). Section 159(c) (1) grants the Board
authority to conduct an election on investigation.
7 The sole provision for judicial review of Board orders provided by the act is a
review of final orders in a court of appeals. 49 Stat. 545 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e), (f) (1958). Prior to this case there were two judicially formulated exceptions
to this general rule: (1) Where there was a substantial claim of denial of constitutional
rights, Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949) ; (2) Where the Board acted in con-
travention of a specific mandate of the LMRA, Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1957).
8
 Empresa Hondurena de Vapores v. McLeod, 49 L.R.R.M. 2303 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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coerces In addition, it has long been clear that Congress can set its own
conditions on the admission of foreign vessels to domestic waters.'° But it
has been equally clear that, as a matter of comity, a policy of mutual fore-
bearance is necessary to avoid retaliation." Where, as here, there is a treaty
involved which may be in conflict with subsequent legislation, an inter-
pretation of the legislation is favored which will not so conflict.' 2 In de-
termining the effect of a federal statute, courts will confine its operations
to the territorial limits of the United States so as to avoid possible conflict
with a foreign sovereignty.' 3 But where Congress has expressly provided
legislation to cover foreign ships in American ports, the principles of comity
yield to overriding considerations of domestic policy, and the courts will
not hesitate to enforce such legislation." In the case of Benz v. Cornpania
Naviera Hidalgo, 15 dealing with the extent of the coverage of the LMRA,
the Supreme Court has decided that Congress had directed the act to create
new legal rights of "American workingmen,"" and, thus, refused to apply
the act to foreign seamen on foreign vessels. But much of the force of the
Benz case is lost by language limiting it to ships which happen to be tem-
porarily in American waters." With the question of how much American
contact is required to submit the foreign flag ships to the authority of
The term "commerce" includes, inter alia, trade, traffic, commerce, transporta-
tion or communication between any foreign country and any state. No distinction is
expressly made between foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. 152 (1958).
1 ° Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) ; Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,
11 US. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) ; Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
See Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 26 (1953).
12 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ; The Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
13
 Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) ; Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S.
185 (1918).
14 Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
15 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
111 The use of the term "American workingmen" should not he construed as mean-
ing only American nationals. See Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 118 N.L.R.B.
1113, 40 L.R.R.M. 1336 (1957), applying the act to aliens working in a foreign cor-
poration with plants located within the United States.
17
 It should be noted at the outset that the dispute from which these actions
sprang arose on a foreign vessel. It was between a foreign employer and . a
foreign crew operating under an agreement made abroad under the laws of a
foreign nation. The only American connection was that the controversy
erupted while the ship was transiently in a United States port, and American
labor unions participated in picketing it.
353 U.S. 138, 142 (1957). See Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S.S. Co.,
362 U.S. 365 (1960) ; Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp.
416 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; and Incres S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union,
10 N,Y.2d 218, 176 N.E.2d 719, 219 N.Y.S.2d 21, cert. granted, 368 U.S. 924 (1961),
so distinguishing Benz. But see Sociedad de Marineros v. McCulloch, N.L.R.B. No.
4040-61, 49 L.R.R.M. 2435 (D.D.C. 1962), where the Honduran labor union
involved in the principal case was granted an injunction restraining the Board from
conducting the election. The court concluded that Benz was dispositive of the issue.
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domestic statutes left open, the court in the instant case applied the criteria
of the Lauritzen's case to determine if the American contacts were sufficient
to make the LMRA applicable. In arriving at its conclusion that the Hon-
duran interests outweigh any American contacts, the court seems to have
been considerably influenced by the intervention of the Departments of
State and Defense which stressed "the important foreign relation considera-
tions involved" and the possibility that assumption of jurisdiction by the
Board would engender "a charge of violation of . . . international agree-
ments."'s Numerous recent cases have, however, on similar facts, disre-
garded the corporate entity of the foreign subsidiary and applied an Amer-
ican statute to the internal affairs of the foreign flag ship. 2° These cases are
examples of the increasingly invoked doctrine that an American owner can-
not escape his statutory liability "merely by interposing a foreign corpora-
tion between himself and the vessel, both of which, for all practical pur-
poses, he owns."21 Such a doctrine seems to be a logical extension of NLRB
v. Hopwood Retinn'ing Co.,22 where an attempt by a parent corporation to
avoid the NLRA by transferring its assets to an out-of-state subsidiary
was regarded as mere subterfuge to avoid the effects of the statute. While
the creation of the "foreign flag fleet" was not intended to circumvent any
policy of a statute, but rather to enable the United States to aid our allies
without violating the Neutrality Act, 23 it has become obvious that the sole
motivation for many shipowners in formally registering their ships abroad
18 Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 11, set forth the following standards to de-
termine the applicability of the Jones Act: (1) Place of the wrongful act; (2) Law
of the flag; (3) Allegiance or domicil of the injured; (4) Allegiance of the defendant
shipowner; (5) Place of contract; (6) Inaccessibility of foreign forum (discounted) ;
(7) The law of the forum.
19 See Brief for Appellant, p. 7. The Department of Defense has facilitated the
transfer of American ships to Pan American registration to keep the ships in active
service. In return the American owners agree to turn the ships over to the United
States for defense purposes in emergencies. The fear of the State Department has been
that if Pan American registration ceases to retain its advantages, American owners
will seek foreign registration which, unlike Pan American registration, does not allow
such return to the United States for defense purposes. West India Fruit and S.S. Co.,
130 N.L.R.B. 343, 47 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1961),
29 Bartholomew v. Universe Tankerships, 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Zielinski
v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, 113 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Incres S.S. Co.
v. International Maritime Workers Union, supra note 17; Navios Corp, v. National
Maritime Union of America, 402 Pa. 325, 166 A.2d 625, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 905
(1961).
21
 Bobolakis v. Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F. Supp. 236,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 158). See also Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied 287 U.S. 642 (1932) ; Jorgensen v. Hutton, 243 App. Div. 31, 276 N.Y.
Supp. 348, affirmed, 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N.E. 566, cert. denied 296 U.S. 602 (1935) ;
Note, 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 549 (1948).
22 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938). Stevens, Corporations 95 (2d ed., 1949).
23 Note, Panhiblon Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships: Govern-
ment Policy and the Problems of the Courts, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 711 (1960) ; Note,
The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet: Regu-
lation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies against Shoreside Picketing, 69
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has been to avoid the statutory regulations imposed on American ship-
owners.24 Consequently, courts have "pressed beyond the formalities of
more or less nominal foreign registration to enforce against American ship-
owners the obligations which our law places upon them.""
Considering the finding by the NLRB that
Empresa's maritime operations are a part of a single integrated
maritime operation under the continuous direct control and either
direct or ultimate ownership of UFCO and are art essential part
of a seagoing enterprise located in and directed from the United
States and engaged in the commerce of this nation , , .
it is difficult to reconcile the instant case with the recent line of cases ap-
plying domestic statutes to the internal affairs of a foreign flagship, used
in domestic commerce, and beneficially owned by an American entrepre-
neur. The court's attempt to distinguish prior cases" as involving for the
most part application of the Jones Act and not involving inconvenience to
a foreign government seems unconvincing in view of the Supreme Court's
prior refusal to apply the Jones Act to bona fide foreign ships on the very
ground that it would be "disruptive of foreign commerce,"28 or would
"sharply conflict with the policy and letter of [a foreign state's] law." 22 The
Board has constantly taken the position that the established application of
the Jones Act would be no less onerous to the foreign government than
would application of the LMRA, whether the vessel be of bona fide foreign
registry or flying a foreign flag of convenience.° While it is not apparent,
nor perhaps conceivable, that Congress intended to expose world shipping
which merely touched our shores to the high labor standards of American
unions, it is submitted that where the undertaking is essentially an Amer-
ican enterprise operating almost exclusively in American commerce, it is at
least arguable that the provisions of the LMRA should be applied regard-
less of the formal registration in Honduras or the employment of Honduran
union workers." Lacking any clear-cut legislation in the area, it would
24 Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 11, at 587. In addition to tax advantages, it
has been estimated that the total operating expenses of foreign-flag vessels are about
one-half those of an American-flag vessel, while wage payments are about one-fourth
as high. Hearings on Vessel Transfer, Trade-In and Reserve Fleet Policies before the
Subcommittee on the Merchant Marine of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 142 (1957).
25 Ibid.
26 United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 25, 27, 49 L.R.R.M. 1138, 1140 (1961).
27 Supra notes 20, 21.
25 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1959).
26 Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 11, at 575.
30
 West India Fruit and S.S. Co., supra note 19; Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co.,
120 N.L.R.B. 1097, 42 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1958). The Board has recently taken jurisdiction
in a foreign flag operation of four tug boats irrespective of one boat's never having
entered domestic waters. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 49 L.R.R.M. 1777, 136 N.L.R.R.
No. 32 (1962).
31 Since, however, [the United States policy of recognizing the flag of a foreign
vessel] does not deter the federal courts from looking behind such flags in
cases involving federal regulatory statutes like the Jones Act, for instance, it
may reasonably be inferred that neither should it deter the National Labor
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seem that the applicability of the LMRA to these foreign flag ships should
lie in the discretion of the Board.
The preliminary question remains, however, whether the federal dis-
trict court had jurisdiction to review the Board's decision that the LMRA
was applicable. Traditionally, judicial relief is available to one injured by
an act of a government official in excess of his express or implied powers. 32
But where, as here, Congress has provided the means for judicial review
in a court of appeals, a party aggrieved by the official's act has been forced
to rely solely on the manner of review provided. 33 A distinction must be
drawn, however, between questions which Congress has left to the dis-
cretion of the governmental agency and questions which require the
agency's performance of a ministerial act. In the latter case, persons ag-
grieved by action or inaction of the agency which is of a ministerial nature
have access to review in a district court, regardless of Congressional pro-
vision for review elsewhere." But when the agency "is given questions of
judgment requiring close analysis and nice choices," 35 the courts will not
interfere without express command of Congress3° In allowing jurisdiction
in the instant case, the court relies initially on Leedom v. Kyne" where
an order of the NLRB in clear violation of the act was held to be reviewable
in the district court. But the Leedom case did not involve a review of a
matter within the discretion of the Board, but rather, a violation of an ex-
plicit statutory requirement." The instant case does not involve the express
limitation on the Board's authority." Freely to allow jurisdiction in cases
involving the Board's discretion would justify the charge that Leedom had
opened a "gaping hole" in the Congressional intent to limit time-consuming
delay and had limited the beneficial effect of the Board. 4° The court justifies
Relations Board from looking behind such flags in cases involving the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
Navios Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, supra note 20 at 338, 166 A.2d
at 632.
32 Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 621-22 (1912) ; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187
U.S. 94, 108 (1902).
83 Switchman's Union v. Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
34 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), where jurisdiction of a district court
was upheld despite the provisions of the applicable statute [58 Stat. 286 (1944), as
amended, 38 U.S,C. 693(h) (Supp. V, 1958), as recodificd, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958), 10
U.S.C. 1153 (1958)], that the findings of the Army Review Board were final subject
only to review by the Secretary of the Army.
85 Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309, 319 (1958).
36 Ibid. Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925).
37 358 U.S. 184 (1958). The argument, based on Fay v. Douds (supra note 6),
that the violation of the treaty with Honduras was unconstitutional in that there was
no clear intent of Congress to violate the treaty was disposed of as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, not of constitutional right.
38 Cases since Leedom have limited it to the violation of clear, mandatory statutory
language. Leedom v. IBEW, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Leedom v. Norwich,
Conn. Printing Specialties, 275 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
39 See note 31, supra, and accompanying text.
40 Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 191 (1958).
See note, The Discretionary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 527 (1957).
541
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
its departure by the fact that relations with a friendly foreign government
are involved. In view of the extreme extraterritorial effect which the
Board's ruling might have, and the intervention of the State Department,
the court seems justified in this unprecedented departure. But the im-
plication of the court's language in arriving at its decision,
We cannot believe Congress would have wished to limit the role
of the courts in that situation to cases where the Board had vio-
lated a 'clear statutory command,'4
seems to create authority for blanket judicial determination "whether in
a particular case Congress would or would not have wished them to inter-
vene . . ."42
It is to be hoped that such language will be strictly limited to the
peculiar facts of this case, lest the inroads to judicial review, and sub-
sequent defeat of the time-saving objectives of national labor policies, be
too readily accessible to the "ingenuity of counsel." 43
JOHN D. O'REILLY, III
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act § 303—Non-Applica-
bility of State Statute of Limitations.—Fischbach CI Moore, Inc. v. in-
ternational Union of Operating Eng'rs. 1 —Two corporations and a joint
venture prosecuted this claim under Section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA—popularly known as Taft-Hartley) 2 for
damages arising out of alleged unfair labor practices by defendant unions.
The union activities constituting the alleged unfair labor practices included
strikes, pickets and work stoppages occurring in 1957. The complaint was
filed three and one half years after the gravamen of the offense. Defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action was barred by the Cali-
fornia three-year statute of limitations 3 was denied. HELD: The state
statute of limitations does not apply to bar plaintiffs' right created by a
federal statute with no limitation period. The Taft-Hartley Act is a statute
of national concern which implies a policy of uniform application to all
persons subject to it, The court felt this compelled the conclusion that
diverse state statutes may not be permitted to qualify or undermine the
federally created right. Of the five possible solutions } to the problem of
what time limitation federal courts should place on similar actions, this court
41 Supra note 1, at 2446-47.
42 Ibid .
43 Supra note 40.
1 198 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
2 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1958).
3 Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 338.1.
4 Judge Clarke listed the five possibilities as: (1) utilization of state statutes of
limitation; (2) utilization of an arbitrary, judicially enacted, period to be applied in
all similar cases; (3) utilization of an analogous federal statute of limitations;
(4) utilization of the equitable doctrine of lathes; (5) utilization of no period of
limitations at all.
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